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EPA Inspections by Private Consultants and
Trade Secret Confidentiality
As a means of enforcing environmental legislation, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regularly conducts inspections of industries and
businesses.' Private consultants are frequently employed by the EPA to
assist in making these inspections because of indadequate staffing or the
agency's need for specialized technical expertise.' In three recent cases
businesses that were the subjects of such inspections objected to the use
of private consultants because they feared disclosure of trade secrets.3
These cases illustrate the conflicting interests that may be involved
when a private consultant under contract with a federal regulatory agency4
inspects a business establishment. The public and the agency desire that
' The authority to conduct such inspections is found in three statutes: the Toxic
Substances Control Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (1976); the Clean Water Act, § 308, 33
U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976); and the Clean Air Act, S 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
2 "Consulting firms ... often perform vital administrative agency functions. The par-
ticipation of these entities in governmental activities benefits the government, for exam-
ple, by providing specialized expertise in technical matters or fresh insights on problems."
Note, The Definition of "Agency" Under the Freedom of Information Act As Applied to Federal
Consultants and Grantees, 69 GEo. L.J. 1223, 1226 (1981); accord S. Rep. No. 698, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 76-77, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4491, 4526; Government's
Brief at 1-2 & n.4, In re Stauffer Chem. Co., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1737 (D. Wyo. June
24, 1980). The EPA noted that in 1980 it had only three employee inspectors available
for Region VIII, which consists of Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
and Wyoming. Id. For additional comments by the EPA concerning its need for private
consultants, see note 55 infra.
' In re Clean Air Act Admin. Insp. of the Bunker Hill Co., 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1063 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 1980; In re Aluminum Co. of America, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1116 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1980); In re Stauffer Chem. Co., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1737
(D. Wyo. June 24, 1980).
' Though this note discusses only the EPA, similar concerns may arise with other
regulatory agencies that employ private consultants to perform a variety of functions. Many
of these agencies have been excluded from the discussion here, however, because they
do not use private consultants for the particular purpose of conducting inspections-in
some instances because the enabling legislation does not permit that use and in others
because the agency's regulations prohibit it. For example, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, § 704(a), 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (Supp. IV 1980), permits only officers.and employees
to make inspections, and under 15 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1976), only those employed by the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission or by the state may conduct inspections. The EPA, when
acting under the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 9, 7 U.S.C. § 136(gxa)
(1976), may use only officers or employees for inspections.
It appears that the Department of Labor may use private consultants to make inspec-
tions under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), §§ 7(c), 8(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 656(c),
657(a) (1976), and 29 C.F.R. % 1903.3-.4 (1981). Though the discussion in this note will be
limited to the EPA and three statutes under which it might act-the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976); and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. % 7401-7642 (Supp. IV 1980)-the same problems
may arise and the same principles may apply when the Department of Labor uses private
consultants to make inspections of business establishments.
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the purposes of the regulatory legislation5 be achieved as efficiently as
possible, which may require the use of private consultants.' On the other
hand, affected businesses fear the use or disclosure of trade secrets by
private consultants who are not under the same confidentiality restraints
as government employees' and who may be affiliated with firms that com-
pete with the businesses subject to inspection." Another concern of
businesses, though not central to the private consultant issue, is the re-
quirement for public disclosure of information held by agencies under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).9
This note seeks to balance these conflicting interests by focusing on
the safeguards for trade secret confidentiality included in the EPA's
statutory and regulatory scheme. The note first argues that a reasonable
reading of the relevant EPA statutes permits the use of private con-
sultants for inspections. Next, the note briefly examines general trade
secret law. The note then contends that the use of private consultants
for inspections by federal regulatory agencies is constitutional and that
the EPA's statutory and regulatory scheme ensures affected businesses
adequate protection for their proprietary interests.
RECENT CHALLENGES TO INSPECTIONS BY PRIVATE CONSULTANTS
In three recent cases businesses challenged the involvement of private
consultants in inspections of their premises because they feared disclosure
of trade secrets." In each case the inspection was to be carried out under
section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act,1' and each challenge arose on a mo-
' For statements of legislative purpose, see 15 U.S.C. S 2601 (1976); 33 U.S.C. S 1251
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. S 7401 (Supp. IV 1980).
6 See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 1905 (1976), provides that a federal employee may
be subject to a fine or imprisonment for the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or
other confidential information. The Federal Reports Act, 44 U.S.C. 5 3508 (1976), governs
interagency transfers of information and provides that an agency employee who receives
confidential information from an employee of another agency is subject to the same sanc-
tions that are applicable to the employee who originally obtained it.
' See Reynolds Metals Co., [1975-1976] O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 20,214, at 24,063 (1975).
9 5 U.S.C. S 552 (1976). The FOIA exempts trade secrets and other confidential business
information from disclosure. Id. at § 552(b)(4). Disclosure under the FOIA may be a concern
to businesses even when no private consultants are involved, and the involvement of private
consultants does not exacerbate the problem. In fact, the use of private consultants might
be advantageous to a business in one situation. If information remains in the control of
a private consultant when it is unneeded for agency purposes, it does not constitute agency
records under the FOIA and, therefore, is not obtainable through an FOIA request. See
Note, supra note 2, at 1226.
10 In re Clean Air Act Admin. Insp. of the Bunker Hill Co., 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1063 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 1980); In re Aluminum Co. of America, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1116, (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1980); In re Stauffer Chem. Co., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1737
(D. Wyo. June 24, 1980).
11 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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tion to quash the administrative warrant. 2 In In re Aluminum Co. of
America,3 the inspection was conducted by an officer of the EPA and
two private consultants without protest by the company; the motion to
quash was filed five days after completion of the inspection.14 In both In
re Clean Air Act Administrative Inspection of the Bunker Hill Co.,1 5 and
In re Stauffer Chemcial Co.,"6 the EPA officers were allowed to enter the
premises, but the private consultants were forbidden entry unless they
agreed to sign a secrecy and hold harmless agreement, which they did
not do. 17 In each of the three cases the private consultants were to be
accompanied and supervised by an EPA employee at all times during the
inspection. 8 The EPA contract with each consulting firm forbade the
unauthorized disclosure of any information claimed to be confidential and
recited that the terms of the contract were for the benefit of and en-
forceable by the affected business as well as the EPA. 9
The federal district courts in Aluminum Co. of America&° and Bunker
Hill' upheld the propriety of the EPA's use of private consultants to
make inspections. The two courts employed similar reasoning and found
that Congress did not intend that the right to enter and inspect under
section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act' be limited to officers and employees
of the EPA and that the EPA regulations, along with other available
remedies, provide adequate confidentiality safeguards.' In contrast, the
district court in Stauffer concluded that section 114(a) permits only EPA
employees to make inspections and that trade secret law does not pro-
vide sufficient protection against disclosure by private consultants.24
"2 The fourth amendment requires the issuance of a warrant for administrative inspec-
tions except in the case of pervasively regulated businesses. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978); text accompanying notes 78-89 infra.
" 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1116.
" Id. at 1117.
,I 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1063.
" 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1737.
17 Id. at 1738; 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1064-65. 40 C.F.R. § 2.215(a) (1982) prohibits
employees of, or private consultants contracting with, the EPA from entering into a con-
fidentiality agreement with an affected business when that agreement is inconsistent with
the EPA's regulations on confidentiality, 40 C.F.R. SS 2.201-.309 (1982). The EPA is obligated
under the FOIA to make certain information available to the public, 5 U.S.C. S 552, and
EPA regulations prevent the impairment of this obligation by contract. See 40 C.F.R. S
2.209(d), 2.215(d)(6) (1981).
1" See 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1064; 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1117; 14 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1738.
" 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1064 (contract also included agreement not to use con-
fidential information to compete with affected businesses); 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1117 (contract also required consulting firm to obtain confidentiality agreements from in-
dividual employees having contact with confidential information); Government's Brief at
3, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1737.
15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1116.
2 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1063.
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
See 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1065-66; 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1117-18.
2 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1740-41. In determining that Stauffer's proprietary in-
19821
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THE STATUTES AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION
The first question to be considered in determining whether the EPA
may employ private consultants to make inspections of business premises
is whether-the statute under which the agency is acting authorizes that
use. Although the three statutes examined here-the Clean Air Act,'
the Clean Water Act,26 and the Toxic Substances Control Act'-do not
explicitly authorize the use of private consultants to make inspections,
each statute may be read to implicitly authorize such use. Because the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts are organized in the same manner and
employ much of the same language, the two will be examined together.
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
Both section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act 8 and section 308(a)(B) of the
Clean Water Act 9 read in part: "[T]he Administrator or his authorized
representative, upon presentation of his credentials.., shall have a right
to entry to... any premises ... and ... may at reasonable times ... in-
spect any monitoring equipment or method required .... 1" Neither statute
specifically defines "authorized representative," but when these words
are read in conjunction with other sections of each statute it appears that
the words were intended to embrace more than just employees of the*
Agency.31
In other sections of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, Congress
used the language "officers, employees, or authorized representatives.""2
It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possi-
ble, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute.' If the term "author-
ized representative" is read to include nothing more than officers and
employees, part of the statutory language is rendered superfluous and
terests were not amply protected, the court ignored the EPA's confidentiality regulations,
40 C.F.R. S 2.201-.309 (1982).
42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (Supp. IV 1980).
33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
, 15 U.S.C. SS 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2- 42 U.S.C. 5 7414(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976).
Id.; 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
, Each section of the statute should be read in the context of the entire act to create
a harmonious whole. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 514 (1949); Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 602 (1945). For an introduction to the "whole
statute" principle of construction, see 2A J. SUTHERLAND. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION S 46.05, 47.02, 47.06 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
- 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. SS 7414(c), 7542(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
" See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973); State
v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 358, 58 N.W. 172, 174 (1894).
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ineffectual.' In other sections of the two statutes, Congress referred
specifically to officers and employees.' It is fair to conclude that had Con-
gress intended to allow only EPA employees to make inspections, it would
have said so by using the terms "officers" and "employees" in the inspec-
tion sections."
The legislative history of these two statutes does not resolve the issue.
The Report of the Senate Public Works Committee on the Clean Water
Act, referring to section 308,11 states:
It should also be noted that the authority to enter, as under the
Clean Air Act, is reserved to the Administrator and his authorized
representatives which such representatives must be full time
employees of the Environmental Protection Agency. The authority
to enter is not extended to contractors with the EPA in pursuit of
research and development.
Although the language of the Committee report rules out the use of
private consultants for inspection purposes, this language should not be
seen as controlling for two reasons. First, the Committee plainly relied
on what it believed to be the intended meaning of the section's counter-
part in the Clean Air Act; it said: "Section 308 establishes authority iden-
tical to the authority for such purposes contained in the Clean Air Act."39
There is some indication, however, that under the Clean Air Act the in-
tention was not to limit the authority to inspect to agency employees,
for the conference committee rejected the more restrictive language of
the House bill, "officers or employees designated by the Secretary,"4 for
more expansive language: "the Administrator or his authorized
' Each word in a statute should be given effect if possible. See Rockbridge v. Lincoln,
449 F.2d 547, 571 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir.
1966); 2A J. SUTHERLAND. supra note 31, 46.06.
33 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. 7525(c), 7542(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The sections
of the Clean Air Act cited here refer to "officers or employees duly designated by the
Administrator."
See In re Clean Air Act Admin. Insp. of the Bunker Hill Co., 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
at 1065; In re Aluminum Co. of America, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1117.
It is a rule of statutory construction that, if reasonably practicable, words
used in one place in a statute with a plain meaning are given the same mean-
ing when found in other parts of the same statute to the end that there may
be a harmonious and consistent body of law.
Randall's Case, 331 Mass. 383, 386, 119 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1954). It follows that the converse
is also true: when different words are used in other parts of the same statute they are
given different meanings. Cf. United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 37, 44
(1911) ("The presence of ... a provision in the one part and its absence in the other is
an argument against reading it as implied.").
33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3668, 3729.
" Id. at 62, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3728.
" H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970) reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 910, 918 (1974).
1982]
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representative. '41 Thus, reliance on the Clean Air Act history in order
to obtain a restricted reading under the Clean Water Act is dubious.
Second, it may be inferred that the Committee's intent behind its ex-
clusion of private consultants from inspections was to prevent disclosure
or improper use of confidential business information by private consultants
who appear, at first glance, not to be affected by the confidentiality
restraints placed upon EPA employees by statute and regulation. But
because EPA regulations effectively characterize private consultants
under contract with the government in the same way as government
employees with respect to confidentiality restraints,42 the Committee's
concern regarding private consultants is unfounded and the countervail-
ing need for their additional expertise should permit their use. Further-
more, "[r]esort to legislative history is only justified where the face of
the Act is inescapably ambiguous."43 This is not the case with section
308(a)(B) of the Clean Water Act44 or section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air
Act.4" In these sections Congress used the phrase "the Administrator or
his authorized representative," while elsewhere it used the terms "of-
ficers" and "employees."46 As Mr. Justice Holmes said: "We do not in-
quire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means. 47
The Toxic Substances Control Act
The EPA is also authorized to use private consultants to make inspec-
tions of business premises under section 11(a) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act.48 This section reads in part: "For purposes of administering
this chapter, the Administrator, and any duly designated representative
of the Administrator, may inspect any establishment.., upon the presen-
tation of appropriate credentials."49 The statute does not define "duly
designated representative," but in other sections it uses the phrase "of-
ficer or employee,"' suggesting that the two terms were not intended
'1 H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 151, 164 (1974).
"2 See notes 134-37 & accompanying text infra.
13 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calver Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Accord, Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935); Fair-
port, P. & E. R.R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1934).
' 33 U.S.C. S 1318(a)(B) (1976).
, 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 33 U.S.C. S 1361(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. SS 7525(c), 7542(a) (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion
of the importance of this distinction, see notes 28-36 & accompanying text supra.
'7 0. W. HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203,
207 (1920). When the effect of statutory language is clear, Committee reports do not con-
trol the interpretation. Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563,
589 (1922).
1- 15 U.S.C. S 2610(a) (1976).
49 Id.
5 Id. SS 2613(a), (d), 2625(e).
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to coincide."
Moreover, Congress expressly contemplated the involvement of private
consultants in performing the responsibilities imposed upon the EPA by
the Act. Section 10 provides that "[t]he Administrator may enter into
contracts . . . for research, development, and monitoring under this
subsection, 5 2 and may also contract "for the development of a data
retrieval system."' Section 14(a) provides in part:
[A]ny information ... obtained by the Administrator (or any represen-
tative of the Administrator) under this chapter ... (2) shall be dis-
closed to contractors with the United States and employees of such
contractors if in the opinion of the Administrator such disclosure is
necessary for the satisfactory performance by the contractor of a con-
tract with the United States ... for the performance of work in con-
nection with this chapter and under such conditions as the Ad-
ministrator may specify.'
Thus, private contractors are involved in acquiring and processing infor-
mation-information often necessarily obtained by inspection. As further
evidence of the propriety of using private consultants to make inspec-
tions, section 14(d) provides for criminal penalties for wrongful disclosure
of information by an employee of the United States and that for this pur-
pose contractors of the United States and their employees are considered
employees of the United States.5
It is reasonable to construe these three EPA statutes to permit the
use of private consultants for inspection purposes. It is a principle of
statutory construction that when a statute is susceptible of more than
one reasonable interpretation, the one that best effectuates rather than
frustrates the purpose of the act should be employed. 6 Allowing private
consultants to make inspections effectuates the purposes of these three
statutes by helping to assure compliance with environmental legislation.
A balancing of interests also favors a construction of these statutes allow-
ing the use of private consultants to make inspections because there are
adequate protections for trade secret owners who fear their proprietary
interests might be jeopardized."
5, Cf. Randall's Case, 331 Mass. 383, 386, 119 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1954) (the same words
used in two or more sections of the statute should be given the same meaning). The reasoning
here is the same as that set forth in the preceding interpretation of 33 U.S.C. S 1318(a)(B)
(1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). See notes 31-36 & accompanying text supra.
' 15 U.S.C. S 2609(a) (1976).Id. 2609(b)(2)(B).
u Id. 2613(a).
' Id. 1 2613(d). This provision was one of the amendments proposed by the EPA. S.
REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4491, 4536. In its explanation the EPA said: "EPA accomplishes a great deal of its in-
vestigatory and analytical tasks by contract. If contractors are not allowed access to infor-
mation under this bill, EPA could not perform its duties satisfactorily without substantial
manpower increases." Id.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948).
" For a discussion of these protections, see notes 109-38 & accompanying text infra.
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THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS
Trade secret protection is not an area of law that is reducible to a few
simple maxims. Although the law of trade secrets is generally recognized,
it has not been treated in a comprehensive manner.' Protection of trade
secrets is primarily a matter of state common law, 9 and, under Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 0 federal courts will apply the law of the ap-
propriate state."
There is no universally accepted definition of a trade secret, but the
one that is most often employed' is that contained in Comment b to sec-
tion 757 of the Restatement of Torts." That comment reads in part: "A
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it.' '" Secrecy is an unequivocal requirement to establish the ex-
Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 594 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated as not ripe, 616 F.2d 662
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1982).
'" See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). Aside from common law rules, a substantial number
of states have criminal statutes that impose liability for the theft of trade secrets. For
an extensive discussion of the statutory provisions for each state, see Epstein, Criminal
Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (1979), in 2 R. MILGRIM. TRADE SECRETS
app. B-5 (1981). In addition to state criminal provisions, there are federal statutes that
can be used to impose criminal liability for trade secret misappropriation. The National
Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2314 (1976), prohibits interstate or foreign transportation
of stolen property of a value of $5,000 or more. Some courts have included trade secrets
within the statutory language of "goods, wares, or merchandise." United States v. Green-
wald, 479 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); United States v. Bottone,
365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937 (1961). 18 U.S.C. S 2315 (1976) operates
in a similar manner by making it unlawful to receive stolen "goods, wares, or merchan-
dise" valued at $5,000 or more.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
" E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (applying Ohio law);
Carson Prod. Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 1979); E.I. duPont deNemours
& Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971)(applying Texas law); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 74
(S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 757, Comment b (1939).
" Id. The comment also lists six factors to be considered in determining the existence
of a trade secret: first, the extent tb which the information is known outside of the business;
second, the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business;
third, the measures taken by the owner to guard its secrecy; fourth, the value of the infor-
mation to the business and to its competitors; fifth, the amount of money or effort ex-
pended by the business in developing the information; and sixth, the ease with which the
information could be properly acquired by others. Id.
For criticisms of the Restatement definition, see F. DESSEMONTET. THE LEGAL PROTEC-
TION OF KNOw-HOw IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23 (2d ed. 1976) (definition out of
date); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Informa-
tion: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 863 (1980) (definition in-
appropriate in context of agency disclosure policies).
[Vol. 57:623
EPA INSPECTIONS
istence of a trade secret; 5 if a reasonable degree of confidentiality is lost,
the trade secret evaporates.6 6
Although a number of theories have traditionally been asserted for relief
for the misappropriation of trade secrets -property, confidential relation-
ship, and contract 6 7-modern commentators view the property rationale
as central to the protection of trade secrets," and most jurisdictions
recognize trade secrets as property.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
After an examination of the three statutes under which the EPA might
act and a determination that the Agency has the statutory authority
to use private consultants to make inspections, the constitutionality of
such use becomes an issue. Administrative inspections that may involve
access to trade secrets may be challenged under two constitutional pro-
visions: first, the fourth amendment prohibition of "unreasonable searches
and seizures,"'" and second, the fifth amendment prohibition of the depriva-
tion of "property without due process of law" and the taking of property
"for public use without just compensation."'72
The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections
The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect persons 3 from
"unreasonable searches and seizures,"74 and this protection is guaranteed
Except in a minority of jurisdictions, it is not required that the secret be known only
to the owner; the majority requirement is one of "relative secrecy." See E. KINTNER &
J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRIMER 14142 (1975).
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Keystone Plastics, Inc.
v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 74 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.
1975); 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
53.3 (3d ed. 1968).
6, See 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 66, S 51, at 345-46; E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note
65, at 190.
" 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 51.1, at 352-53; 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 59, at S
1.01-.08.
" See, e.g., In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying Indiana law);
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (applying federal
securities law); Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1978) (applying New Jersey law),
vacated as not ripe, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1982); 2 R.
CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 51.1, at 349; E. KINTNER & J. LAHR. supra note 65, at 191.
70 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (1976); 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 Corporations are also protected by the fourth amendment. Mancusi v. De Forte, 392
U.S. 364, 367 (1968); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205-08 (1946);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,392 (1920); Spahr v. United States,
409 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
by the requirement of a warrant issued only upon probable cause. 5 The
restrictions of the fourth amendment have traditionally been applied only
to government action,78 but an inspection carried out by a private consul-
tant under contract with the EPA would be deemed governmental and
not private action.
These requirements apply to administrative inspections as well as to
criminal searches. In Camara v. Municipal Court,78 the Court held un-
constitutional a warrantless inspection authorized by a city housing code.
The Court held that the particularized probable cause required in criminal
cases is not necessary for administrative inspections, and that probable
cause for an area inspection under a reasonable governmental scheme
is sufficient. 79 Camara thus shifted the focus from probable cause to
,reasonableness, balancing the public interest against the degree of the
intrusion.' In See v. Seattle,8 a companion case to Camara, the Court held
that the Camara standard applies to administrative inspections of business
establishments as well as of private residences.
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,' the Supreme Court made clear that the
warrant requirement applies to federal regulatory agencies although the
Court limited its holding to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.'
The Court held Section 8(a) of the Act' unconstitutional insofar as it might
be read to authorize warrantless inspections of an employer's premises.
The Court reasoned that the industries regulated under the Act did not
have "such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expec-
11 Id. Courts have always read the warrant clause as supplemental to the reasonableness
clause, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963), and have permitted
warrantless searches only when they fall within one of the narrow exceptions, Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978), see, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)
(exigent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) ("pervasively regulated business"); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970) (automobile search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (incident to arrest).
7' See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
" For a case finding government action on facts somewhat analogous to an EPA inspec-
tion carried out by a private consultant see People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d
505 (1955) (fourth amendment violated by private engineer employed by district attorney
and police department to plant hidden microphone on private property). When govern-
ment officials instigate or participate in a search executed by a private person, courts
generally characterize the search as government action. For an explanation of the theories
upon which such a characterization may be based and supporting cases, see 1 N. LA FAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 114-39 (1978). For additional sources on the application of the fourth
amendment to searches carried out by private parties, see Stapleton v. Superior Court,
70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
71 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
71 Id. at 538.
'8 See id. at 539.
"I 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
29 U.S.C. SS 651-78 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Id. at S 657(a).
436 U.S. at 325.
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tation of privacy could exist,"' and that inspections under the Act were
not exempt from the requirements of the fourth amendment under the
exception for "pervasively regulated business[es]" carved out in United
States v. Biswel17 and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States." The
standard for probable cause applied in Barlow's was the lesser and more
generalized one of Camara,9 requiring that the business be chosen as
part of "a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act
derived from neutral sources" and satisfying "reasonable . . . ad-
ministrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection."90
The Court in Barlow's followed the Camara reasonableness analysis,
quoting the Camara Court's statement that "'reasonableness is still the
ultimate standard."' 91 The Barlow's Court found that the requirement of
a warrant issued upon probable cause served to assure the reasonableness
of searches under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.2 The Barlow's
Court left open the possibility that warrants might not be constitution-
ally required under other administrative statutes, stating that "[t]he
reasonableness of a warrantless search ... will depend upon the specific
enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute.", A balanc-
ing of interests demonstrates that the use of private consultants by the
EPA to make inspections of business premises is not inherently
unreasonable. 4
The Fifth Amendment
As property, trade secrets are covered by the due process and "tak-
ings" clauses of the fifth amendment.95 In Wearly v. FTC,9M a federal district
court found that trade secrets were property protected by the taking
clause. 7 The court said: "Failure to provide adequate protection to assure
confidentiality [of trade secrets], when disclosure is compelled by the
government, amounts to an unconstitutional 'taking' of property by
Id. at 313.
406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
397 U.S. 72 (1970).
387 U.S. at 538.
436 U.S. at 320-31.
91 Id. at 315 (quoting 387 U.S. at 539).
12 See id. at 323. It should be noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976) requires that one of
the agents directed in the warrant be present, but that he may request other persons
to accompany and assist him. United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd
on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961), held that a search warrant may be directed to a
class of agents. Id. at 629. Presumably a warrant could be issued to EPA officers as a
class and one would have to be present during the search.
436 U.S. at 321.
See notes 109-38 infra.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
462 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated as not ripe, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1982).
See id. at 597.
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
destroying it, or by exposing it to the risk of destruction by public
disclosure or by disclosure to competitors.""5 In Wearly a company chal-
lenged a subpoena duces tecum for documents containing trade secrets,
alleging that Federal Trade Commission (FTC) procedures were inade-
quate to protect the confidentiality of the data.9 The court did not sug-
gest that the FTC should not have access to the information under any
circumstances; instead, it recognized a balancing of interests and focused
on means of assuring confidentiality. The court said:
[Compelled disclosures of proprietary information require a balanc-
ing quid pro quo. Because of the unique nature of the property, which
exists only so long as .there is only a disclosure that is itself privi-
. leged, the only suitable quid pro quo is an arrangement, tailored to
the particular case, that insures against accidental .... unauthorized,
or improper disclosure.' 0
In Zotos International, Inc. v. Kennedy,' a federal district court found
that trade secrets were property for fifth amendment due process
purposes. 0 ' In that case, Zotos asked the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for trade secret status for ingredients in one of Zotos' cosmetic
products. 3 The FDA denied the request, saying the ingredients were
commonly used in such products and were not secret.' After determin-
ing that Zotos' alleged trade secret was a property interest deserving
due process protection, the district court held that the FDA procedures
for evaluating requests for trade secret protection were invalid under
the due process clause.' The Zotos court held that, although a trial-type
hearing was not required, a "petitioner must have some means, before
an agency issues a final order, of engaging in a reasonably focused dialogue
" Id. at 598.
" See id. at 591-93. An alternative allegation was that the FTC was unwilling to provide
safeguards. Id. at 593. A trade secret owner might be justified in having greater fears
of disclosure when dealing with the FTC than with other agencies. See Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Government Disclosure of Private Trade Secret Information, 56 IND. L.J. 347,
360 & nn.75-76 (1981). The risk under EPA procedures is not as great, however. See id.
at 360-61.
" 462 F. Supp. at 599. Though the district court opinion was vacated on ripeness grounds,
the Third Circuit agreed that FTC procedures were often inadequate to assure confiden-
tiality and that it was "understandable" that the district court was concerned for the plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights in its proprietary interests. 616 F.2d at 664.
101 460 F. Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 273. The Supreme Court, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972),
said that property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Accord, Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1977). Because states protect trade secrets, see notes
58-69 & accompanying text supra, the requisite rules and expectations are present.
'03 460 F. Supp. at 270. Regulations issued pursuant to section 5 of the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1454 (1976), provide that each ingredient of a consumer cosmetic
must be listed on the product's label unless that would require divulgence of a trade secret.
21 C.F.R. S 701.3(a) (1982.
104 See 460 F. Supp. at 270.
lOS Id. at 274-79.
[Vol. 57:623
EPA INSPECTIONS
with the agency concerning the major points at issue in a trade secret
request.""1 ' The court thus required at least the basics of due process-
notice and opportunity to comment.1 0 7 EPA procedures provide these
basics. '08
THE USE OF PRIVATE CONSULTANTS TO MAKE INSPECTIONS
IS WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
The EPA has recognized the problems posed by trade secrets with
respect to both the use of private consultants for inspections and the
disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The
EPA's policy statement on disclosure, contained in its regulations, says
in part: "EPA will make'the fullest possible disclosure of records to the
public, consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, [and] the rights
of persons in business information entitled to confidential treatment."'' 9
In light of this policy, the EPA has promulgated regulations"' meant to
assure trade secret owners protection of their proprietary interests that
is adequate and that meets the requirements of the fourth and fifth
amendments.' Both the analysis under the fourth amendment"' and that
under the fifth amendment"' suggest a balancing of the privacy protec-
tions in the statutory or regulatory scheme against the proprietary in-
terests at stake.
Protections Within the EPA Statutes
Both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act contain provisions
exempting trade secrets from the requirements of public disclosure, as
does the FOIA."5 These provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act refer to the Trade Secrets Act, which imposes criminal liabil-
ity on officers or employees of federal departments or agencies who
disclose confidential information, including trade secrets." '6
1C Id. at 279.
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), said: "The essehce
of due process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice
of the case agaihst him and opportunity to meet it."' Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
108 See text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.
10 40 C.F.R. § 2.101(a) (1982).
,,0 Id. §§ 2.201-.309.
,,1 See id. § 2.101(a).
"' See notes 73-94 & accompariying text supra.
", See notes 95-108 & accompanying text supra.
1' 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (Supp. IV 1980); 33 U.S.C. S 1318(b) (1976).
I's 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976) exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." The EPA and other federal
agencies are required to disclose nonexempt agency records on the request of "any per-
son." Id. S 552(a).
16 18 U.S.C. 5 1905 (Supp. IV 1980).
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The Toxic Substances Control Act contains its own criminal liability
provision for wrongful disclosure.'17 Under this provision, information that
falls within the trade secret exemption of the FOIA 8 may not be
divulged."' Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the criminal penalties
for disclosure of confidential information apply to private consultants as
well as to EPA officers and employees."'
EPA Regulations on Confidentiality
Regulations promulgated by the EPA address more specifically con-
cerns regarding private consultants' access to trade secrets, as well as
more general concerns about public disclosure."' They provide that an
affected business may assert a confidentiality claim regarding informa-
tioh the EPA has obtained." The EPA will then make a preliminary deter-
mination on that claim, notifying the affected business and providing it
with an opportunity to comment." The EPA will find that information
is entitled to confidential treatment if, first, the business has taken
reasonable steps to protect the confidentiality of the information; second,
the information is not reasonably obtainable outside the business; third,
no statute specifically requires disclosure; and fourth, either the business
has shown that disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm or the infor-
mation has been voluntarily submitted and disclosure would likely im-
pair the government's ability to obtain information in the future."4 In
the meantime, FOIA requests will be initially denied." A final confiden-
tiality determination will be made after the opportunity to comment."'
If the final determination rejects the claim of confidentiality, the EPA
will notify the affected business of that determination, of the reasons
therefor, that it constitutes final agency action, and that the action is
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)."'
15 U.S.C. 5 2613(d) (1976).
1 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(4) (1976).
15 U.S.C. S 2613(a) (1976).
"' Id. S 2613(d)(2). This section states that for the purposes of imposing criminal liability
on government employees "any contractor with the United States who is furnished infor-
mation ... and any employee of such contractor, shall be considered to be an employee
of the United States."
.2- 40 C.F.R. SS 2.201-.309 (1982).
" Id. 5 2.203(a), (b).
" Id. 5 2.204(d), (e).
" Id. S 2.208. The first and second factors track traditional trade secret law. See notes
64-66 & accompanying text supra.
40 C.F.R. S 2.204(d){(l(ii) (1982).
1' Id. S 2.205.
17 Id. S 2.205(f)(2). The judicial review provisions of the APA are found at 5 U.S.C. SS
701-706 (1976).
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Although the information may not be released to the public, if a find-
ing of confidentiality has been made it may be furnished to others in
restricted situations."n Information may be released if requested by
Congress, '29 or if disclosure is required by a court order. ' If an official
need is shown, the information may be released within the EPA, or to
another federal agency when the agency agrees in writing to make no
unauthorized disclosure."' EPA employees are prohibited from disclos-
ing confidential information or using it for private advantage, and must
take appropriate measures to protect its confidentiality.'2 Violations are
subject to a number of sanctions, ranging up to criminal prosectuion for
willful violations.ln
The EPA regulations specifically treat confidential information obtained
by private consultants under the inspection sections of the Clean Air Act'"
and the Clean Water Act. 35 These regulations require that a consultant's
access to trade secrets be limited to that necessary to enable him to carry
out his functions under the contract between the EPA and the consulting
firm. 3 ' In addition, access is permitted only if the contract includes three
obligations: first, that the contractor and its employees will use the infor-
mation only for the purpose of carrying out the work required by the
contract, will refrain from disclosing the information to anyone outside
the agency without the written consent of the affected business or an
EPA legal office, and will return all copies of the information when the
required work is completed; second, that the contractor will obtain a writ-
ten agreement to honor these terms from each of the employees who will
have access to the information before access is allowed; and third, that
the contractor acknowledges that the contract provisions concerning
disclosure and use are included for the benefit of, and shall be enforceable
by, both the EPA and any affected business.' 37
The EPA statutes considered here and the regulations promulgated
thereunder contain adequate safeguards for maintaining the confidentiality
of trade secrets. This is true for private consultants as well as for Agency
employees. Moreover, the EPA relies on the expertise and manpower
of private consultants.'" In the interest of best achieving compliance with
Ill 40 C.F.R. § 2.209 (1982).
Id. 5 2.209(b).
'3 Id. 5 2.209(d).
Id. 5 2.209(c), (e).
11 Id. 5 2.211.
,23 Id. 5 2.211(c).
,1, Id. 5 2.301(h).
' Id. 5 2.302(h).
11 Id. S 2.301(h)(2)(i). The provisions of id. § 2.301(h) are incorporated by reference into
id. 5 2.302(h) (Clean Water Act) and id. § 2.306(j) (Toxic Substances Control Act).
' Id. § 2.301(h)(2)(ii).
1" See notes 2 & 55 supra.
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the statutes, the use of private consultants to make inspections should
be permitted.
CONCLUSION
The EPA should be permitted to continue using private consultants
to make inspections of business premises. A reasonable construction of
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act permits such use. Agency utilization of private consultants for
inspection purposes does not exceed the constitutional limitations of the
fourth or fifth amendments because the Agency's statutory and regulatory
scheme offers adequate protection to trade secret owners against
unauthorized use or disclosure by private consultants. The public interest
and the Agency's need for the information outweigh the risks to trade
secret owners.
SHARON L. GROEGER
